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Abstract
In this paper, we study physical layer security for the downlink of cellular networks, where the confidential
messages transmitted to each mobile user can be eavesdropped by both (i) the other users in the same cell and
(ii) the users in the other cells. The locations of base stations and mobile users are modeled as two independent
two-dimensional Poisson point processes. Using the proposed model, we analyze the secrecy rates achievable
by regularized channel inversion (RCI) precoding by performing a large-system analysis that combines tools
from stochastic geometry and random matrix theory. We obtain approximations for the probability of secrecy
outage and the mean secrecy rate, and characterize regimes where RCI precoding achieves a non-zero secrecy
rate. We find that unlike isolated cells, the secrecy rate in a cellular network does not grow monotonically with
the transmit power, and the network tends to be in secrecy outage if the transmit power grows unbounded.
Furthermore, we show that there is an optimal value for the base station deployment density that maximizes
the secrecy rate, and this value is a decreasing function of the signal-to-noise ratio.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Security is regarded as a critical concern in wireless multiuser networks. Due to its broadcast nature,
wireless multiuser communication is very susceptible to eavesdropping, and it is essential to protect the
transmitted information. The emergence of large-scale and dynamic networks imposes new challenges
on classical security measures such as network layer cryptography. To this end, exploiting the physical
layer has been proposed as an alternative to achieve perfect secrecy without requiring key distribution
and complex encryption/decryption algorithms [1]. In the past few years, physical layer security has
become a very active area of research, and has witnessed significant growth [2]–[5].
A. Motivation and Related Work
Physical layer security for multi-user communications was first investigated by introducing the
broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC) [6]. In the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
BCC, a central base station (BS) with N antennas simultaneously communicates to K users which can
act maliciously as eavesdroppers. The secrecy capacity region of a two-user MIMO BCC was studied,
among others, in [7]–[9], under the assumption of perfect channel state information (CSI) available at
the BS. The secrecy degrees of freedom, capturing the behavior of the secrecy capacity in the high
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime, were studied in [10], [11] for the case when only delayed CSI
is available at the BS. For larger BCC with an arbitrary number of malicious users, linear precoding
based on regularized channel inversion (RCI) was proposed as a practical, low-complexity transmission
scheme [12]. In [13], [14], the authors employed random matrix theory tools to study the secrecy rate
achievable by RCI precoding in the BCC under imperfect CSI and spatially correlated channels. In
all these contributions, eavesdropping activity was assumed from the malicious users only. In practice,
external nodes might be eavesdropping too.
The presence of external eavesdropping nodes and its effect on the secure connectivity in random
wireless networks were studied in [15], [16], where the authors investigated the secrecy communication
3graphs by employing stochastic geometry tools. It was shown in [17] that an improvement in the secure
connectivity can be achieved by introducing directional antenna elements, whereas [18] investigated
the throughput cost of security. The secrecy rates achievable in large ad hoc networks in the presence
of colluding eavesdroppers and the scaling laws for secrecy capacity were derived in [19] and [20],
respectively. The broadcast channel with confidential messages and external eavesdroppers (BCCE)
was then introduced in [21] to model a more general setting where both malicious users and randomly
located external nodes can act as eavesdroppers.
With a key exception of [22], almost all the prior art focused on either an isolated cell or an ad hoc
network, as discussed above. An attempt to study secrecy rate in the downlink of a cellular network is
made in [22] by using tools from stochastic geometry. The current paper differs from and generalizes
[22] in three key aspects: (i) while [22] considers single antenna transmission with orthogonal resource
allocation, we consider a significantly generalized physical layer model with multiple transmit antennas
serving multiple users with RCI based linear precoding, which may result in intra-cell interference,
(ii) while [22] assumes that the interfering BSs are far away and that the inter-cell interference can
be incorporated in the constant noise power, our model accounts for the exact inter-cell interference
at the typical user, and (iii) while [22] assumes that only certain nodes in the network can eavesdrop
without cooperation, we assume that all the users except the typical user, for which the secrecy rate
and outage is computed, can cooperate to eavesdrop the transmitted messages meant for the typical
user. Ignoring the three aspects above in the design of a physical layer security system, would make
confidential communications vulnerable to secrecy outage caused by co-channel interference and inter-
cell information leakage. For these reasons, it is of critical importance to extend the study of physical
layer security to cellular networks, by taking into account the interference and the information leakage
at cooperating malicious users.
4B. Approach and Contributions
The main goal of this paper is to study physical layer security in the downlink of cellular networks,
where each BS simultaneously transmits confidential messages to several users, and where the confi-
dential messages transmitted to each user can be eavesdropped by both (i) other users in the same cell
and (ii) users in other cells. Moreover, this paper takes into account the inter-cell interference generated
by each BS, as well as the fact that malicious users can cooperate. This is a practical scenario that
has not yet been addressed. In this paper, we model the locations of BSs and mobile users as two
independent two-dimensional Poisson point processes (PPPs), and we analyze the performance of RCI
precoding by combining tools from stochastic geometry and random matrix theory. Stochastic geometry
(SG) is a powerful tool to study cellular networks with a random distribution of BSs and users [23],
[24], whereas random matrix theory (RMT) enables a deterministic abstraction of the physical layer,
for a fixed cellular network topology [25]. By combining results from SG and RMT, we can explicitly
characterize the achievable secrecy rates accounting for (i) the spatial distribution of BSs and users,
and (ii) the fluctuations of their channels. Our main contributions are summarized below.
• We obtain an approximation for the probability of secrecy outage Pˆo in a cellular network under
RCI precoding. We find regimes where RCI precoding achieves confidential communication with
probability of secrecy outage Pˆo < 1. We also find that since cellular networks are interference-
and-leakage-limited, they tend to be in secrecy outage w.p. 1 if the transmit power grows un-
bounded. This is different to the case of an isolated cell, where the probability of secrecy outage
can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the number of transmit antennas [21].
• We derive an approximation for the mean per-user secrecy rate achievable by RCI precoding in
a cellular network. We find that RCI precoding can achieve a non-zero secrecy rate, however
the secrecy rate in a cellular network does not grow unbounded with the transmit SNR. This is
different to the case of an isolated cell, where an achievable secrecy rate can grow monotonically
with the transmit SNR for a sufficient number of transmit antennas [13].
5• We show that in a cellular network there is an optimal value for the density of BSs λb that
maximizes the mean secrecy rate. The value of λb trades off useful signal power, interference,
and information leakage. We find that the optimal deployment density λb is a decreasing function
of the SNR.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the downlink of a cellular
network with malicious users. In Section III, we characterize the secrecy rates achievable by RCI
precoding. In Section IV, we derive approximations for the probability of secrecy outage and the mean
secrecy rate. In Section V, we provide numerical results to confirm the accuracy of the analysis. The
paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Topology
We consider the downlink of a cellular network, as depicted in Fig. 1. Each BS transmits at power
P and is equipped with N antennas. The locations of the BSs are drawn from a homogeneous PPP Φb
of density λb. We consider single-antenna users, and assume that each user is connected to the closest
BS. The locations of the users are drawn from an independent PPP Φu of density λu. We denote by
Kb and by Kb = |Kb| the set of users and the number of users connected to the BS b, respectively.
We denote by Hb = [hb,1, . . . ,hb,Kb ]
† the Kb×N channel matrix for the BS b, where hb,j ∼ CN (0, I)
is the channel vector that accounts for the fading between the BS b and the user j ∈ Kb.
B. RCI Precoding
Transmission takes place over a block fading channel. The signal transmitted by the generic BS b is
xb = [xb,1, . . . , xb,N ]
T ∈ CN×1. We consider RCI precoding because it is a linear scheme that allows
low-complexity implementation [26], [27]. Although suboptimal, RCI precoding is particularly inter-
esting because it can control the amount of crosstalk between the users [28]–[30]. In RCI precoding,
the transmitted vector xb is obtained at the BS b by performing a linear processing on the vector
6Fig. 1. Illustration of a cellular network. The circles, squares, and triangles denote BSs, out-of-cell users, and in-cell users, respectively.
The star denotes a typical user as discussed in Subsection II-C.
of confidential messages mb = [mb,1, . . . ,mb,Kb ]
T , whose entries are chosen independently, satisfying
E[|mb,j|2] = 1,∀j. The transmitted signal xb after RCI precoding can be written as xb =
√
PWbmb,
where Wb = [wb,1, . . . ,wb,Kb ] is the N ×Kb RCI precoding matrix, given by [29]
Wb =
1√
ζb
H†b
(
HbH
†
b +NξIKb
)−1
(1)
and ζb = tr
{
H†bHb
(
H†bHb +NξIN
)−2}
is a long-term power normalization constant. The function
of the real regularization parameter ξ is to achieve a tradeoff between the signal power at the legitimate
user and the crosstalk at the other users served by the same BS. The optimal value for the parameter
ξ in cellular networks is unknown, and we leave its calculation as a future work. Since the results
obtained in this paper hold for any value of ξ, we will now assume that each BS sets ξ to the value
that maximizes the large-system secrecy rate in an isolated cell, given by [13]
ξ =
−2ρ2 (1− β)2 + 6ρβ + 2β2 − 2 [β (ρ+ 1)− ρ] ·√β2 [ρ2 + ρ+ 1]− β [2ρ (ρ− 1)] + ρ2
6ρ2 (β + 2) + 6ρβ
, (2)
where β is the ratio between the number of users in the cell and the number of antennas at the BS.
7C. Malicious Users
In general, the BSs cannot determine the behavior of the users, i.e., whether they act maliciously
as eavesdroppers or not. As a worst-case scenario, we assume that for each legitimate user, all the
remaining users in the network can act as eavesdroppers. For a user o connected to the BS b, the set of
Kb−1 malicious users within the same cell is denoted byMIo = Kb\o, and the set formed by the rest
of the malicious users in the network is denoted byMEo = Φu\Kb. In Fig. 1, the legitimate user o, the
set of (intra-cell) malicious users MIo, and the set of (external) malicious users MEo are represented
by star, triangles, and squares, respectively. The total set of malicious users for the legitimate receiver
o is denoted by Mo = MIo ∪MEo = Φu\o. It is important to make such a distinction between the
intra-cell malicious users in MIo and the external malicious users in MEo . In fact, the BS b knows the
channels of the intra-cell malicious users in MIo ⊂ Kb, and exploits this information by choosing an
RCI precoding matrix Wb which is a function of these channels. The RCI precoding thus controls the
amount of information leakage at the malicious users in MIo. On the other hand, the BS b does not
know the channels of all the other external malicious users in MEo , and Wb does not depend upon
these channels. Therefore, the signal received by the malicious users in MEo is not directly affected
by RCI precoding.
III. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATES
In this section, we derive a secrecy rate achievable by RCI precoding for the typical user in the
downlink of a cellular network.
A. SINR at a Typical User
We consider a typical user o located at the origin, and connected to the closest BS, located in c ∈ Φb.
The distance between the typical user and the closest BS is given by ‖c‖. The typical user receives
self-interference caused by the other messages mc,u, u 6= o transmitted by the BS c, and inter-cell
8TABLE I
NOTATION SUMMARY
Notation Description
Φb; λb A PPP modeling the locations of BSs; deployment density of BSs
Φu; λu An independent PPP modeling the locations of users; density of the users
P ; ρ Downlink transmit power for each BS; SNR ρ , P
σ2
N ; c Number of transmit antennas for each BS; BS which is closest to the origin o
Kb; Kb = |Kb| Set of users associated with BS b; number of users associated with BS b
MIo = Kc\o Set formed by the Kc − 1 malicious users in the same cell as the typical user
MEo = Φu\Kc Set formed by the malicious users in all the other cells
mb; xb =
√
PWbmb Confidential messages sent by BS b to its users; signal transmitted by BS b
hb,j ∼ CN (0, I); η Channel vector between BS b and user j; path loss exponent
gb,o ∼ Γ(Kb, 1) Inter-cell interference power gain from BS b to the typical user in o
gc,e ∼ exp(1) Leakage power gain from BS c to the malicious user e ∈MEo
interference caused by the signal transmitted by all the other BSs b ∈ Φb\c. The signal received by
the typical user is given by
yo =
√
P ‖c‖−η h†c,owc,omc,o +
√
P ‖c‖−η
∑
u∈Kc\o
h†c,owc,umc,u +
∑
b∈Φb\c
√
P ‖b‖−η
Kb∑
j=1
h†b,owb,jmb,j + no
(3)
where ‖b‖ is the distance between the typical user and the generic BS b, and η is the path loss
exponent. The four terms in (3) represent the useful signal, the crosstalk (or self-interference), the
inter-cell interference, and the thermal noise seen at the typical user, respectively. The latter is given
by no ∼ CN (0, σ2), and we define the SNR as ρ , P/σ2.
We assume that the legitimate receiver at o treats the interference power as noise. The SINR γo at
the legitimate receiver o is given by
γo =
ρ‖c‖−η ∣∣h†c,owc,o∣∣2
ρ‖c‖−η∑u∈Kc\o ∣∣∣h†c,owc,u∣∣∣2 + ρ∑b∈Φb\c gb,oKb ‖b‖−η + 1 , (4)
9where we define w˜b,j ,
√
Kbwb,j and
gb,o ,
Kb∑
j=1
∣∣∣h†b,ow˜b,j∣∣∣2 . (5)
B. SINR at the Malicious Users
The cell where the typical user o is located is referred to as the tagged cell. For the typical user o,
the set of malicious users is denoted by Mo =MIo ∪MEo , where MIo = Kc\o is the set of remaining
users in the tagged cell, and MEo = Φu\Kc is the set of all users in other cells.
We assume that each malicious user can communicate directly to any other malicious user within
a cooperation radius rc around it, i.e., cooperation is possible for distances smaller than rc. This
assumption comes from the following model: assume that malicious users can transmit at a certain
power PM and that their signal is attenuated over distance according to a deterministic decreasing
function l(d). Assume also that malicious users can succesfully receive data if the signal is at least
t times stronger than the ambient noise, which has power Pn. Even under the condition that the
interference is perfectly canceled, there is a maximum distance beyond which the two users cannot
cooperate. This distance, referred to as the cooperation radius, is given by
rc , max
{
d :
PM l(d)
Pn
≥ t
}
. (6)
By connecting each pair of cooperating malicious users, it is possible to generate a random plane
network [31], which represents an infinite cooperation network of malicious users with range rc. It is
known that if the density of users satisfies λu > 8 log 2r2c , the random plane network contains an infinite
cluster almost surely. An illustration of this phenomenon, known as percolation, is provided in Fig. 2.
As a result, if the density of users λu is large enough, then percolation will occur, and there will be
an infinite set of malicious users cooperating to eavesdrop the message intended for the typical user.
Motivated by these observations, in the following we will consider the worst-case scenario where
all the malicious users in Mo can cooperate to eavesdrop on the message intended for the typical
user in o. Since each malicious user is likely to decode its own message, it can indirectly pass this
10
Fig. 2. Example of percolation in a random plane network. Dots represent malicious users, and discs represents the cooperation range
of malicious users. Two malicious users can cooperate when their respective discs overlap.
information to all the other malicious users. In the worst-case scenario, all the malicious users in Mo
can therefore subtract the interference generated by all the messages mj , j 6= o.
After interference cancellation, the signal received at a malicious user i ∈MIo in the tagged cell is
given by
yi =
√
P ‖i− c‖−η h†c,iwc,omc,o + ni (7)
where ‖i− c‖ is the distance between the BS c and the malicious user i ∈ MIo. The signal received
at a malicious user e ∈MEo outside the tagged cell is given by
ye =
√
P ‖e− c‖−η h†c,ewc,omc,o + ne. (8)
We denote by γi and γe the SINRs at the malicious users i ∈MIo and e ∈MEo , respectively.
Due to the cooperation among all malicious users in Mo =MIo ∪MEo , the set Mo can be seen as
a single equivalent multi-antenna malicious user, denoted by Mo. After interference cancellation, Mo
sees the useful signal embedded in noise, therefore applying maximal ratio combining is optimal, and
11
yields to an SINR given by
γM,o =
∑
i∈MIo
γi +
∑
e∈MEo
γe = ρ
∑
i∈MIo
‖i− c‖−η
∣∣∣h†c,iwc,o∣∣∣2 + ρKc ∑
e∈MEo
gc,e‖e− c‖−η, (9)
where
gc,e ,
∣∣h†c,ew˜c,o∣∣2 , (10)
with w˜c,o ,
√
Kcwc,o and ni, ne ∼ CN (0, σ2).
C. Achievable Secrecy Rates
We are now able to obtain an expression for the secrecy rate achievable by RCI precoding for the
typical user of a downlink cellular network.
Proposition 1. A secrecy rate achievable by RCI precoding for the typical user o is given by
R ,
{
log2
(
1 +
ρ‖c‖−η ∣∣h†c,owc,o∣∣2
ρ‖c‖−η∑i∈MIo ∣∣∣h†c,owc,i∣∣∣2 + ρI + 1
)
− log2
(
1 + ρ
∑
i∈MIo
‖i− c‖−η
∣∣∣h†c,iwc,o∣∣∣2 + ρL
)}+
, (11)
where we use the notation {x}+ , max (x, 0), and where I and L represent the interference and
leakage term, respectively, given by
I =
∑
b∈Φb\c
gb,o
Kb
‖b‖−η (12)
L =
1
Kc
∑
e∈MEo
gc,e‖e− c‖−η. (13)
Proof: The BS c, the user o, and the equivalent malicious user Mo form an equivalent multi-input,
single-output, multi-eavesdropper (MISOME) wiretap channel [32]. As a result, an achievable secrecy
rate is given by [12]
R = {log2 (1 + γo)− log2 (1 + γM,o)}+ . (14)
Substituting (4) and (9) in (14) yields (11).
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The statistics of the terms gb,o and gc,e in (5) and (10), respectively, can be characterized as follows
[33].
Proposition 2. For regularized channel inversion precoding we have that (i) the inter-cell interference
power gain at the typical legitimate user o is distributed as gb,o ∼ Γ(Kb, 1), and (ii) the leakage power
gain at the malicious user e ∈MEo is distributed as gc,e ∼ exp(1).
Proof: See Appendix A.
We now define the probability of secrecy outage and the mean secrecy rate for the typical user.
Definition 1. The probability of secrecy outage for the typical user o is defined as
Po , P(R ≤ 0). (15)
The probability of secrecy outage also denotes the fraction of time for which a BS cannot transmit
to a typical user at a non-zero secrecy rate.
Definition 2. The mean secrecy rate for the typical user o is defined as
Rm , E [R] . (16)
IV. LARGE-SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive approximations for (i) the secrecy outage probability, i.e., the probability
that the secrecy rate R achievable by RCI precoding for the typical user o is zero, and (ii) the mean
secrecy rate achievable by RCI precoding in the downlink of a cellular network.
A. Preliminaries
Throughout the analysis, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. For uniformity of notation, we assume Kc = Kb = K , λuλb , ∀b, i.e., we approximate
the number of users served by each BS by its average value, given by the ratio between the density
of users and the density of BSs. In order for this equivalence to hold, we ignore a small bias that
13
makes the tagged cell bigger than a typical cell. This bias is a result of Feller’s paradox, also known
as waiting bus paradox in one dimension [34].
Assumption 2. We assume ‖i − c‖ ≈ ‖c‖, ∀i ∈ MIo, i.e., we approximate the distance between the
tagged BS c and each user connected to c by the distance between the BS c and the typical user o.
We then approximate the Voronoi region of the tagged BS c by a ball centered at c and with radius
r = 1√
piλb
, i.e., B(c, r) , {m ∈ R2, ‖m− c‖ ≤ r}. For the sake of consistency, the value of r is chosen
to ensure that B(c, r) has the same area as the average cell.
Note that despite these assumptions, which are necessary to maintain tractability, our analysis
captures all the key characteristics of the cellular networks that affect physical layer security, as
discussed in the sequel. The simplified model also provides some fundamental insights into the
dependence of key performance metrics, such as secrecy outage and mean secrecy rate, on the transmit
power and BS deployment density.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we obtain the approximationsMIo ≈ MˆIo andMEo ≈ MˆEo , where MˆIo
is a set of K − 1 malicious users located at distance ‖c‖ from the BS c, and MˆEo is a set given by
MˆEo = {e ∈ Φu ∩ B¯(c, r)}, (17)
with B¯ denoting the complement of the set B. We can then approximate the interference and leakage
terms in (12) and (13) as follows
I ≈ Iˆ = 1
K
∑
b∈Φb\c
gb,o‖b‖−η (18)
L ≈ Lˆ = 1
K
∑
e∈MˆEo
gc,e‖e− c‖−η. (19)
We now carry out a large-system analysis by assuming that both (i) the average number of users
K in each cell, and (ii) the number of transmit antennas N at the each BS grow to infinity in a fixed
ratio β , K
N
. We can thus approximate the remaining random quantities in (11) by their large-system
14
deterministic equivalents [35], [36]
∣∣h†c,owc,o∣∣2 ≈ α, ∑
i∈MˆIo
∣∣h†c,owc,i∣∣2 ≈ χ, and ∑
i∈MˆIo
∣∣∣h†c,iwc,o∣∣∣2 ≈ χ, (20)
where
α =
g (β, ξ)
{
1 + ξ
β
[1 + g (β, ξ)]2
}
[1 + g (β, ξ)]2
, χ =
1
[1 + g (β, ξ)]2
, (21)
and
g (β, ξ) =
1
2
√(1− β)2
ξ2
+
2 (1 + β)
ξ
+ 1 +
1− β
ξ
− 1
 , (22)
and where it follows from (2) that
lim
ρ→∞
χ = 0, for β ≤ 1. (23)
An approximated secrecy rate can be therefore obtained as follows.
Definition 3. An approximation for the achievable secrecy rate R is given by
R ≈ Rˆ ,
{
log2
(
1 +
ρα‖c‖−η
ρχ‖c‖−η + ρIˆ + 1
)
− log2
(
1 + ρχ‖c‖−η + ρLˆ
)}+
. (24)
In Fig. 3 we compare the simulated ergodic secrecy rate R in (11) to the approximation Rˆ in (24),
obtained in the large-system regime under Assumptions 1 and 2. The secrecy rates R and Rˆ are plotted
versus the SNR ρ, for a system with N = 20 transmit antennas, an average number K = 20 of users
per cell, a path loss exponent η = 4, and two values of the density of BS λb. Fig. 3 shows that R and
Rˆ follow the same trend, and that the approximation R ≈ Rˆ is reasonable. The figure also shows that
in a cellular network the secrecy rate does not monotonically increase with the SNR. A more detailed
discussion on this phenomenon will be provided in Subsection IV-D.
B. Characterization of Iˆ and Lˆ
We now provide some results on the Laplace transforms of the terms Iˆ and Lˆ which will be useful
in the remainder of the paper.
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Fig. 3. Comparison between the simulated ergodic secrecy rate R in (11) and the approximation Rˆ in (24) versus the SNR, for N = 20
transmit antennas, an average of K = 20 users per BS, and η = 4.
Lemma 1. The Laplace transform of the interference term LIˆ(s, ‖c‖) = E[e−sIˆ ] is
LIˆ(s, ‖c‖) = exp
(
−
( s
K
) 2
η
λbCη,K (s, ‖c‖)
)
(25)
where
Cη,K (s, ‖c‖)= 2pi
η
K∑
n=1
(
K
n
)[
B
(
1;K−n+ 2
η
, n− 2
η
)
−B
(
(1+
sP
K
‖c‖−η)−1;K−n+ 2
η
, n− 2
η
)]
,
(26)
and B(x; y, z) =
∫ x
0
ty−1(1− t)z−1dt is the incomplete Beta function.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Lemma 2. The Laplace transform of the leakage term LLˆ(s) = E[e−sLˆ] is
LLˆ(s) = exp
(
−λu
( s
K
) 2
η
Dη(s)
)
(27)
where
Dη(s) =
2pi
η
[
B
(
1;
2
η
, 1− 2
η
)
−B
(
1
1 + s
K
r−η
;
2
η
, 1− 2
η
)]
. (28)
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Proof: The proof is omitted since it is similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
The probability density functions (pdfs) fIˆ and fLˆ of Iˆ and Lˆ, respectively, can be obtained by
inverting the respective Laplace transforms LIˆ and LLˆ. We now propose simple approximations for
fIˆ and fLˆ, using the following well-known results [37].
Proposition 3. The mean and the variance of the interference term Iˆ are respectively given by
µIˆ =
2piλb‖c‖−(η−2)
η − 2 , (29)
σ2
Iˆ
=
piλb (K +K
2) ‖c‖−2(η−1)
K2 (η − 1) , (30)
whereas the mean and the variance of the leakage term Lˆ are respectively given by
µLˆ =
2piλur
−(η−2)
K(η − 2) , (31)
σ2
Lˆ
=
2piλur
−2(η−1)
K2 (η − 1) . (32)
Proof: See Appendix C.
We then approximate the pdfs of Iˆ and Lˆ by lognormal distributions with the same respective mean
and variance, as follows.
Definition 4. The probability density functions of Iˆ and Lˆ can be approximated as follows
fIˆ(x) ≈
1
xσIˆ,N
√
2pi
exp
−
(
log x− µIˆ,N
)2
2σ2
Iˆ,N
 , x > 0 (33)
fLˆ(z) ≈
1
zσLˆ,N
√
2pi
exp
−
(
log z − µLˆ,N
)2
2σ2
Lˆ,N
 , z > 0 (34)
where
µIˆ,N = log µIˆ −
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2
Iˆ
µ2
Iˆ
)
, σ2
Iˆ,N
= log
(
1 +
σ2
Iˆ
µ2
Iˆ
)
(35)
µLˆ,N = log µLˆ −
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2
Lˆ
µ2
Lˆ
)
, σ2
Lˆ,N
= log
(
1 +
σ2
Lˆ
µ2
Lˆ
)
. (36)
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Fig. 4. Comparison between the simulated cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of Iˆ and Lˆ and the lognormal approximations in
(33) and (34), for an SNR ρ = 10dB, N = 20 transmit antennas, K = 20 users per BS, ‖c‖ = r, and η = 4.
In Fig. 4 we compare the simulated cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of Iˆ and Lˆ to the
lognormal approximations provided in (33) and (34). The CDFs are plotted for an SNR ρ = 10dB,
N = 20 transmit antennas, an average of K = 20 users per BS, ‖c‖ = r, η = 4, and three values
of the density of BS λb. Fig. 4 shows that the lognormal approximations provided in Definition 4 are
accurate for all values of λb.
C. Probability of Secrecy Outage
We now obtain an approximation for the probability of secrecy outage with RCI precoding.
Theorem 1. The probability of secrecy outage with RCI precoding can be approximated as
Po ≈ Pˆo =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
1(z≥τ(x,y)) fLˆ(z) dz fIˆ(x, y) dx 2λbpiye
−λbpiy2 dy, (37)
where fIˆ(x, y) is the probability density function of the interference Iˆ for ‖c‖ = y, fLˆ(z) is the
18
probability density function of the leakage Lˆ, and where we have defined
τ(x, y) , αy
−η
ρχy−η + ρx+ 1
− χy−η. (38)
Proof: By using approximation (24) in (15), we obtain
Po ≈ P(Rˆ ≤ 0) = P
(
ρχ‖c‖−η + ρLˆ ≥ α‖c‖
−η
χ‖c‖−η + Iˆ + 1
ρ
)
= P
(
Lˆ ≥ α‖c‖
−η
ρχ‖c‖−η + ρIˆ + 1 − χ‖c‖
−η
)
(a)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
P
(
Lˆ ≥ τ(x, y)
)
fIˆ(x, y | ‖c‖ = y) f‖c‖(y) dx dy
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
E
[
1(Lˆ≥τ(x,y))
]
fIˆ(x, y) dx 2λbpiye
−λbpiy2 dy
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
1(z≥τ(x,y)) fLˆ(z) dz fIˆ(x, y) dx 2λbpiye
−λbpiy2 dy, (39)
where (a) holds by defining τ(x, y) as in (38), and by noting that the distance ‖c‖ between the typical
user and the nearest BS c has distribution [38]
f‖c‖(y) = 2λbpiy exp(−λbpiy2), y > 0. (40)
The result provided in Theorem 1 allows to evaluate the probability of secrecy outage without the
need for Monte-Carlo simulations, which can be computationally expensive to account for all users
and all exact Voronoi cells. Moreover, Theorem 1 yields to the following asymptotic result without
the need to solve the integral.
In an isolated cell, a sufficient number of transmit antennas allows the BS to cancel the intra-cell
interference and leakage, and to drive the probability of secrecy outage to zero [21]. In a cellular
network, the secrecy outage is also caused by the inter-cell interference and leakage, which cannot
be controlled by the BS. It is easy to show that limρ→∞ τ(x, y) ≤ 0, which from Theorem 1 implies
limρ→∞ Pˆo = 1. We therefore have the following result.
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Remark 1. In cellular networks, RCI precoding can achieve confidential communication with prob-
ability of secrecy outage Pˆo < 1. However unlike an isolated cell, cellular networks tend to be in
secrecy outage w.p. 1 if the transmit power grows unbounded, irrespective of the number of transmit
antennas.
D. Mean Secrecy Rate
In the following, we derive the mean secrecy rate achievable by RCI precoding.
Theorem 2. The mean secrecy rate achievable by RCI precoding can be approximated as
Rm ≈ Rˆm =
∫ ∞
0
∫ α
ρχ
− 1
ρ
−χy−η
−∞
{
log2
(
1 +
ραy−η
ρχy−η + ρx+ 1
)∫ τ(x,y)
−∞
fLˆ(z)
−
∫ τ(x,y)
−∞
log2
(
1 + ρχy−η + ρz
)
fLˆ(z) dz
}
fIˆ(x, y) dx 2λbpiye
−λbpiy2 dy. (41)
Proof: See Appendix D.
The result provided in Theorem 2 allows to evaluate the mean secrecy rate without the need for
computationally expensive Monte-Carlo simulations. Moreover, Theorem 2 yields to the following
asymptotic result without the need to solve the integral.
In an isolated cell, a sufficient number of transmit antennas allows the BS to cancel the intra-cell
interference and leakage, and the secrecy rate increases monotonically with the SNR [13]. In a cellular
network, the secrecy rate is also affected by the inter-cell interference and leakage, which cannot be
controlled by the BS. It is easy to show that limρ→∞ αρχ − 1ρ − χy−η ≤ 0, which from Theorem 2
implies limρ→∞ Rˆm = 0. We therefore have the following result.
Remark 2. In cellular networks, RCI precoding can achieve a non-zero secrecy rate Rˆm. However
unlike an isolated cell, the secrecy rate in a cellular network is interference-and-leakage-limited, and
it cannot grow unbounded with the SNR, irrespective of the number of transmit antennas.
Theorem 2 shows that an optimal value for the BS deployment density λb should be found as a
tradeoff between (i) increasing the useful power αy−η, and (ii) reducing the intra-cell interference
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χy−η and leakage χy−η, and the inter-cell interference x and leakage z. We know from (23) that χ
vanishes at high SNR, thus the terms x and z become dominant in (41). For a given cell load K = λu
λb
,
the terms x and z are minimized by small densities λb. We therefore have the following result which
we will validate by simulations in Section V.
Remark 3. In a cellular network with a fixed load, i.e., average number of users per BS, there is an
optimal value for the deployment density of BSs that maximizes the mean secrecy rate, and this value
is a decreasing function of the SNR. The optimal value of λb can be found from (41) by performing
a linear search.
In order to calculate the mean secrecy rate in (41), one must obtain expressions for fIˆ and fLˆ via
Laplace anti-transform or via approximations, as discussed in Section IV-B. We now derive a lower
bound on Rˆm which can be calculated without knowledge of fIˆ and fLˆ.
Corollary 1. The approximated mean secrecy rate Rˆm can be lower bounded as
Rˆm ≥ RˆLBm =
{∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
[
F∗1 (φ, y)LIˆ(−i2piφ, y)−F∗2 (φ, y)LLˆ(−i2piφ)
]
dφ 2λbpiye
−λbpiy2dy
}+
,
(42)
with
F1(φ, y) = sgn(φ) e
2pii(χy−η+ 1
ρ
)φ
2φ log 2
(
1− e2piiαφy−η
)
, (43)
F2(φ, y) = −e
2pii(χy−η+ 1
ρ
)φ
log 2
[
1
2 |φ| +
γ
ρ
δ(φ)
]
. (44)
Proof: See Appendix E.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In Fig. 5 we compare the simulated probability of secrecy outage Pˆo to the analytical result given
in Theorem 1, for N = 20 transmit antennas, K = 20 users per BS, and three values of the density of
BSs λb. The analytical curves were obtained by using lognormal approximations for the pdfs fIˆ(x, y)
and fLˆ(z). The figure shows that the result provided in Theorem 1 is accurate for all values of λb at
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Fig. 5. Comparison between the simulated probability of secrecy outage Pˆo and the analytical result from Theorem 1, for N = 20
transmit antennas, K = 20 users per BS, and three values of the density of BSs λb.
relatively low values of SNR. Due to the lognormal approximations, the result is slightly less accurate
at relatively high values of SNR, when the BS can cancel the intra-cell interference and leakage [13],
and the secrecy outage is mostly determined by Iˆ and Lˆ.
In Fig. 6 we compare the simulated mean secrecy rate Rˆm to the analytical result given in Theorem
2, for N = 20 transmit antennas, K = 20 users per BS, and two values of the density of BSs λb. The
analytical curves were again obtained by using lognormal approximations for the pdfs fIˆ(x, y) and
fLˆ(z). The figure shows that the simulations and the analytical result from Theorem 2 follow the same
trend. Therefore, the analysis provides insights into the behavior of the secrecy rate as a function of
λb and the SNR. The result from Theorem 2 is accurate for all values of λb at relatively low values
of SNR. Again due to the lognormal approximations, the analytical curve is less accurate at relatively
high values of SNR, since χ vanishes as reported in (23), and the secrecy rate in (41) is dominated
by Iˆ and Lˆ. This inaccuracy could be avoided by employing the exact pdfs of fIˆ(x, y) and fLˆ(z),
obtained from their Laplace transforms in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, but the anti-transform operation is
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Fig. 6. Comparison between the simulated mean secrecy rate Rˆm and the analytical result from Theorem 2, for N = 20 transmit
antennas, K = 20 users per BS, and two values of the density of BSs λb.
computationally expensive. Finding better approximations for fIˆ(x, y) and fLˆ(z) is therefore identified
as a promising research problem.
In Fig. 7 we plot the simulated probability of secrecy outage versus the SNR, for K = 10 users per
BS and three values of the number of transmit antennas N . In this figure, two cases are considered
for the density of BSs λb, namely 0.01 and 0.1, while the density of users is given by λu = Kλb.
Figure 7 shows that RCI precoding achieves confidential communications in cellular networks with
probability of secrecy outage Pˆo < 1, and that having more transmit antennas is beneficial as it reduces
the probability of secrecy outage. However unlike an isolated cell [21], cellular networks tend to be in
secrecy outage w.p. 1 if the transmit power grows unbounded, irrespective of the number of transmit
antennas. These observations are consistent with Remark 1.
In Fig. 8 we plot the simulated per-user ergodic secrecy rate versus the SNR, for K = 10 users
per BS and three values of the number of transmit antennas N . In this figure, again, two cases are
considered for the density of BSs λb, namely 0.01 and 0.1, while the density of users is given by
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Fig. 7. Simulated probability of secrecy outage versus SNR, for K = 10 users per BS and various values of the number of transmit
antennas N and density of BSs λb.
λu = Kλb. Fig. 8 shows that in cellular networks RCI precoding can achieve a non-zero secrecy rate,
and that having more transmit antennas is beneficial as it increases the secrecy rate. However unlike
the secrecy rate in an isolated cell [13], the secrecy rate in a cellular scenario does not grow unbounded
with the SNR, even with a large number of transmit antennas. These observations are consistent with
Remark 2.
In Fig. 9 we plot the simulated per-user ergodic secrecy rate as a function of the density of BSs λb,
for N = 20 transmit antennas, K = 20 users per BS, and various values of the SNR. Fig. 9 shows
that there is an optimal value for the density of BSs λb that maximizes the secrecy rate, and that such
value is smaller for higher values of the SNR. This observation is consistent with Remark 3.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered physical layer security for the downlink of cellular networks, where
multiple base stations (BSs) generate inter-cell interference, and malicious users of neighboring cells
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can cooperate to eavesdrop. We showed that RCI precoding can achieve a non-zero secrecy rate with
probability of outage smaller than one. However we also found that unlike isolated cells, the secrecy
rate in a cellular network does not grow monotonically with the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and the
network tends to be in secrecy outage if the transmit power grows unbounded. We further showed that
there is an optimal value for the density of BSs that maximizes the secrecy rate, and this value is a
decreasing function of the SNR. Using the developed analysis, we clearly established the importance of
designing the transmit power and the BS deployment density to make communications robust against
malicious users in other cells.
Investigating the secrecy rates in heterogeneous networks, where small BSs are overlaid within the
macro cellular network based on traffic and coverage demand, is identified as a promising research
problem. Moreover, obtaining an exact characterization of the pdfs of the interference and leakage
power could be an interesting future research direction.
APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 2: Under RCI precoding, the BS b multiplies the confidential message mb,j
destined for user j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ Kb, by wb,j , so that the transmitted signal is a linear function of the
message mb,j , i.e., xb =
√
P
∑Kb
j=1 wb,jmb,j . The inter-cell interference power gain at the typical user
o is given by gb,o =
∑Kb
j=1
∣∣∣h†b,ow˜b,j∣∣∣2, with w˜b,j = √Kbwb,j . The normalized precoding vectors w˜b,j
have unit-norm on average, and they are calculated independently of h†b,o. Therefore, h
†
b,o and w˜b,j are
independent isotropic unit-norm random vectors, and
∣∣∣h†b,ow˜b,j∣∣∣2 is a linear combination of N complex
normal random variables, i.e., exponentially distributed. As a result, we have that gb,o ∼ Γ(Kb, 1), since
it is the sum of Kb i.i.d. exponential r.v.
The leakage power gain at the malicious user e ∈ MEo is given by gc,e =
∣∣h†c,ew˜c,o∣∣2, with w˜c,o =
√
Kcwc,o. Similarly, we have that h†c,e and w˜c,o are independent isotropic unit-norm random vectors.
As a result, we have that gc,e ∼ exp(1) since it is a linear combination of N complex normal r.v.
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APPENDIX B
Proof of Lemma 1: The Laplace transform of the interference term Iˆ can be derived as follows
E
[
e−sIˆ
]
= E
[
e−
s
K
∑
b∈Φb\c gb,o‖b‖
−η]
= E
 ∏
b∈Φb\c
e−
s
K
gb,o‖b‖−η
 (a)= EΦb
 ∏
b∈Φb\c
Lgb,o
( s
K
‖b‖−η
)
(b)
= exp
{
−λb
∫
R2∩B¯(o,‖c‖)
[
1− Lgb,o
( s
K
‖b‖−η
)]
db
}
(c)
= exp
{
−λb
∫
R2∩B¯(o,‖c‖)
[
1− 1(
1 + s
K
‖b‖−η)K
]
db
}
= exp
{
−λb
∫
R2∩B¯(o,‖c‖)
(
1 + s
K
‖b‖−η)K − 1(
1 + s
K
‖b‖−η)K db
}
(d)
= exp
−λb
∫
R2∩B¯(o,‖c‖)
∑K
n=1
(
K
n
) (
s
K
‖b‖−η)n(
1 + s
Kb
‖b‖−η
)K db

= exp
{
−λb
K∑
n=1
(
K
n
)∫
R2∩B¯(o,‖c‖)
(
s
K
‖b‖−η)n(
1 + s
K
‖b‖−η)K db
}
(e)
= exp
{
−2piλb
( s
K
) 2
η
K∑
n=1
(
K
n
)∫ ∞
‖c‖( s
K
)
− 1η
ν−nη
(1 + ν−η)K
νdν
}
(f)
= exp
{
−λb
( s
K
) 2
η
Cη,K (s, ‖c‖)
}
, (45)
where (a) follows since the channel powers gb,o are independent of the locations of the BSs, (b)
follows from the PGFL of a PPP [39], (c) follows from the Laplace transform of gb,o ∼ Γ(K, 1), (d)
follows from the Binomial theorem, (e) follows by converting to polar coordinates, and (f) follows
by substituting (1 + ν−η)−1 = t and noting that the integral is the difference of two incomplete Beta
functions B(x; y, z) =
∫ x
0
ty−1(1− t)z−1dt.
APPENDIX C
Proof of Proposition 3: The mean and variance of the interference can be obtained by applying
Campbell’s theorem and are given by [37]
µIˆ = E
[
Iˆ
]
(a)
= EΦb
 ∑
b∈Φb\c
‖b‖−η
 = 2piλb ∫ ∞
‖c‖
v−ηv dv =
2piλb‖c‖−(η−2)
η − 2 (46)
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σ2
Iˆ
= E
[
Iˆ2
]
− µ2
Iˆ
(b)
=
K +K2
K2
E
 ∑
b∈Φb\c
‖b‖−2η

=
2piλb (K +K
2)
K2
∫ ∞
‖c‖
v−2ηv dv =
piλb (K +K
2) ‖c‖−2(η−1)
K2 (η − 1) , (47)
where (a) follows from E[gb,o] = K, and (b) follows from E
[
g2b,o
]
= K + K2. Similarly, the mean
and variance of the leakage are given by [37]
µLˆ = E
[
Lˆ
]
(c)
=
1
K
EΦu
 ∑
e∈MˆEo
E [gc,e] ‖e− c‖−η
 = 2piλu
K
∫ ∞
r
v−ηv dv =
2piλur
−(η−2)
K (η − 2) (48)
σ2
Lˆ
= E
[
Lˆ2
]
− µ2
Lˆ
(a)
=
2
K2
E
 ∑
e∈MˆEo
‖e− c‖−2η
 = 4piλu
K2
∫ ∞
r
v−2ηv dv =
2piλur
−2(η−1)
K2 (η − 1) , (49)
where (c) follows from E[gc,e] = 1, and (d) follows from E
[
g2c,e
]
= 2.
APPENDIX D
Proof of Theorem 2: By using approximation (24) in (16), we obtain
Rm ≈ E
[
Rˆ
]
= E
[{
log2
(
1 +
ρα‖c‖−η
ρχ‖c‖−η + ρIˆ + 1
)
− log2
(
1 + ρχ‖c‖−η + ρLˆ
)}+]
= E
[[
log2
(
1 +
ρα‖c‖−η
ρχ‖c‖−η + ρIˆ + 1
)
− log2
(
1 + ρχ‖c‖−η + ρLˆ
)]
1(Lˆ<τ(Iˆ,‖c‖))
]
= E
Iˆ,‖c‖
[
log2
(
1 +
ρα‖c‖−η
ρχ‖c‖−η + ρIˆ + 1
)
P
(
Lˆ < τ
(
Iˆ , ‖c‖
))]
− E
Iˆ,Lˆ,‖c‖
[
log2
(
1 + ρχ‖c‖−η + ρLˆ
)
1(Lˆ<τ(Iˆ,‖c‖))
]
(a)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ α
ρχ
− 1
ρ
−χy−η
−∞
{
log2
(
1 +
ραy−η
ρχy−η + ρx+ 1
)∫ τ(x,y)
−∞
fLˆ(z)
−
∫ τ(x,y)
−∞
log2
(
1 + ρχy−η + ρz
)
fLˆ(z) dz
}
fIˆ(x, y) dx 2λbpiye
−λbpiy2 dy, (50)
where 1(·) is the indicator function, and where the upper limit in the inner integration in (a) follows
from 0 ≤ Lˆ < τ(Iˆ , ‖c‖).
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APPENDIX E
Proof of Corollary 1: The lower bound in (42) can be obtained as follows
Rˆm = E
[
Rˆ
] (a)
≥
{
E
[
log2
(
1 +
ρα‖c‖−η
ρχ‖c‖−η + ρIˆ + 1
)
− log2
(
1 + ρχ‖c‖−η + ρLˆ
)]}+
=
{∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
[
log2
(
1 +
ραy−η
ρχy−η + ρx+ 1
)
fIˆ(x, y)
− log2
(
1 + ρχy−η + ρx
)
fLˆ(x)
]
dx 2λbpiye
−λbpiy2dy
}+
(b)
=
{∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
[
F∗1 (φ, y)LIˆ(−i2piφ, y)−F∗2 (φ, y)LLˆ(−i2piφ)
]
dφ 2λbpiye
−λbpiy2dy
}+
. (51)
Equation (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality E[x+] ≥ {E[x]}+. Equation (b) follows by Parseval’s
theorem [40], and since
F1(φ, y) = sgn(φ) e
2pii(χy−η+ 1
ρ
)φ
2φ log 2
(
1− e2piiαφy−η
)
(52)
F2(φ, y) = −e
2pii(χy−η+ 1
ρ
)φ
log 2
[
1
2 |φ| +
γ
ρ
δ(φ)
]
(53)
are the respective Fourier transforms of
f1(x, y) = log2
(
1 +
ραy−η
ρχy−η + ρx+ 1
)
(54)
f2(x, y) = log2
(
1 + ρχy−η + ρx
)
, (55)
where γ = limn→∞
(∑n
k=1
1
k
− log n) is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. The functions F1(φ, y) and
F2(φ, y) can be obtained from the Fourier transforms of 1x and log |x|, and by applying the differen-
tiation and shift theorems.
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